People use information about the covariation between a putative cause and an outcome to determine if a causal relationship obtains. When there are two candidate causes and one is more strongly related to the effect than the other, the influence of the second is underestimated. This phenomenon is called causal discounting. In two studies, we adapted paradigms for studying causal learning to apply signal detection analysis to this phenomenon. We investigated whether the presence of a stronger alternative makes the task more difficult (indexed by differences in d'), or if people change the standard by which they assess causality (measured by β). Our results indicate the effect is due to bias.
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Humans can use knowledge of covariation to predict events and to infer their underlying causes (Cheng, 1997) . Although research has demonstrated a number of systematic phenomena in covariation and causal judgment, it is unclear whether these effects occur during the learning or decision process. Here we use signal detection theory (SDT) to tease apart these alternatives for one phenomenon: causal discounting.
Discounting is a cue interaction effect, in which someone judges a moderately effective cause as less effective when it is learned about in the presence of a highly effective alternative (e.g., Baker et al., 1993; Goedert & Spellman, 2005) . For example, a person taking a steroid and antihistamine for allergies may believe a 50%-effective antihistamine is less effective, if used with a 90%-effective steroid. Another type of cue interaction arises when the occurrence of two cues is confounded and participants control for the alternative cue when judging the target (Spellman, 1996) . Here we focus on the case where participants devalue a target cause in the presence of an alternative and the causes are unconfounded-i.e., causal discounting proper (Goedert, Harsch & Spellman, 2005) .
Although cue interaction phenomena are reliably observed in both causal judgment and prediction, it is debated whether these phenomena reflect learning processes or decision processes (Stout & Miller, 2007) . For instance, in our example above, the perceived effectiveness of the antihistamine may be lower because less is learned about it when the more effective steroid is present. Alternatively, the highly effective steroid may bias the judgment process by "raising the bar" for effectiveness. Signal detection analyses allow one to determine whether changes in performance reflect changes in the participant's sensitivity-i.e., the ability to detect contingency between the cause and outcome-or changes in the participant's decision criterion.
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SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005 ) is a data analytic tool that disentangles a person's sensitivity to detect a stimulus (d') from that person's bias to say 'yes' (β). These latent variables are calculated from two components of participants' responses: The hit rate (h) is the proportion of trials in which participants say 'yes' when the candidate is causal. The false alarm rate (fa) is the proportion of trials that participants say 'yes' when the candidate is non-causal.
SDT has successfully differentiated learning from decision processes in memory research:
For example, training in mnemonic techniques affects sensitivity, leaving bias unchanged (McNicol & Ryder, 1971) . Conversely, changing the payoff structure for correct responses affects bias, not sensitivity (Healy & Kubovy, 1978) . A brief sketch will illustrate these ideas:
Imagine a word list in which people typically recognize 62.5% of the old words (h), but also say they remember 47.5% of the lures (fa). One group is taught a new study strategy for remembering words. At test, their performance is much improved relative to the standard:
h=75% and fa=25% ( Figure 1A ). Another group is sternly warned not to miss any words. Their rates differ: h=75% and fa=50% ( Figure 1B ). It is clear that the mnemonic increases retention, but the warning only makes participants more likely to say 'yes.'
SDT makes some processing assumptions. First, there is ambient noise in people's representational systems. Over time, the value represented will vary around a mean ( Figure 1 , N distributions). When a signal occurs (e.g., an old word), the value increases by an amount proportional to the signal's strength. Thus, the signal distribution is similar, but shifted ( Figure   1 , S distributions). The distance between the distributions is d': how easily they are differentiated. It is calculated by passing the rates through an inverse cumulative distribution function (yielding z-scores), and finding the difference:
A second assumption is that a person will say 'yes' if the current value is above some threshold ( Figure 1, vertical lines) . This criterion could be anywhere, but optimal accuracy is achieved where the distributions cross ( Figure 1A ). Such a person is unbiased: At that point, the likelihood that the value is a signal equals the likelihood it is noise. However, some people may be overeager ( Figure 1B ) or excessively hesitant to say 'yes'. The ratio of the likelihoods at the criterion is β, the relative amount of evidence required to say 'yes':
where, f(x) is the normal distribution's likelihood function Because β ranges from 0 to +∞, with β=1 as unbiased, its distribution necessarily is highly skewed, and is typically transformed via the natural logarithm. We follow this policy. Thus, ln(β) is positive for those participants hesitant to say 'yes' and negative for overeager subjects 1 .
Our brief sketch above also suggests a quasi-SDT analysis that avoids SDT's assumptions:
The easier it is to differentiate between true causes and uncorrelated candidates, the greater the difference should be between h and fa. In addition, it is clear that the overall tendency to say 'yes' is indexed by the mean of h and fa. These measures are quite similar to d' and β and can be used when SDT's requirements are not met.
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Researchers have begun to apply SDT to causal induction, primarily examining situations in which participants evaluate a single candidate cause (Allan, Siegel, & Tangen, 2005; Perales et al., 2005 To apply SDT to the case of discounting, we adopted the streamed-trial technique developed by Allan et al. (2008) . In a streamed-trial, participants view a large number of events in one unbroken stream before responding. Each trial contains complete contingency information and these contingencies can change from trial to trial. Importantly, participants' responses on each trial can be objectively correct or incorrect (i.e., hits and false alarms). Crump et al. (2007) have validated the streamed trial method by replicating standard phenomena of contingency learning.
We extended the streamed-trial technique to the two-cause case. Like standard SDT in which the stimulus is either present or absent, participants saw one of two trial types: target causal or non-causal. We independently varied the strength of the alternative cause. An example of a streamed-trial appears in Figure 2 . At the end of each streamed-trial, participants responded whether the target cause increased the probability of the effect. On some proportion of trials when the target is causal, the participant will say 'yes,' but may also say 'yes' when the target is non-causal (producing h and fa respectively).
Experiments 1 and 2 differed only in their participants, cover story, and stimuli.
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Participants
Undergraduates at the University of Texas, Austin, (Experiment 1: 90, with 45 in each condition; Experiment 2: 195, with 97 in the strong alternative condition and 98 in the weak alternative condition) participated for course credit.
Design & Contingency Structures
We employed a single between-subjects factor (alternative strength: strong vs. weak). We measured contingency as ΔP (Allan, 1980) , the change in probability of the outcome given the presence of the candidate cause [P(O|C)] from its absence [P(O|~C)]:
If the causes are unconfounded, ΔP can be applied to multi-cause situations by using marginal frequencies instead of cell frequencies (i.e., collapsing over the other causes).
In the strong alternative condition (SA) ΔP of the alternative was .33 and in the weak alternative (WA) ΔP A =.00. Because SDT requires equal numbers of trials in which the answer is objectively yes and no, we devised two contingency structures for each condition: one in which the target was causal, ΔP T =.22, and one where it was not, ΔP T =.00. Thus, the experiments employ four contingency structures ( Figure 3 ), with ΔP A equivalent within conditions, but differing between them, and ΔP T differing among trials within conditions.
Cover Story & Stimuli
In Experiment 1, participants determined whether liquids made it more likely that a flower would bloom. On each trial participants viewed multiple events depicting a plant blooming or
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Causal Discounting 8 not, with zero, one, or two watering cans pouring liquid onto the plant. Above each can was displayed a pronounceable three-letter non-word identifying the liquid (Rastle et al., 2002) . Each trial used unique names, reinforcing the independence of the trials.
In Experiment 2, participants were medical researchers determining whether medicines made it more likely that patients got well. Stimuli were drawings of a smiley face (recovery) or a sickly green face (death) with a pill on one, both, or neither side. Above each pill was written a pronounceable three-letter non-word that stood for its chemical name, and which varied from trial to trial.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually on computers. After reading instructions and viewing sample slides, they viewed 72 streamed trials. Each streamed trial consisted of 36 events and contained one of the contingency structures depicted in Figure 3 . Each event was displayed for 550ms, with a 100ms ISI; each trial lasted 23.4s. Each participant saw a mixture of only two types of streamed trials constituting the contingency structures (target causal and non-causal) for their condition.
Participants initiated each trial by hitting "enter." At the end of each streamed trial, participants responded whether they thought the probability of the outcome (i.e., blooming or recovering) was increased by the cause on the left (i.e., liquid or drug), and then the cause on the right. The target's side (left or right) was counterbalanced within participants.
Results
Differentiating ΔPs of .00 and .22 is very difficult and a number of our participants failed to discriminate between the target causal and non-causal trials. Twelve participants in Experiment and β is meaningless. We thought it important to conduct analyses for sensitivity and bias over the same participants. Thus, for both experiments, we report two sets of analyses: SDT analyses for participants whose d'>0 (i.e., participants who were able to discriminate the trial types), but also the quasi-SDT analyses for all participants. Throughout, we adopt α=.05.
There was no evidence of learning or fatigue across trials. We scored for accuracy by assigning 1 to every trial in which participants judged the target correctly and 0 if incorrect.
Collapsing over both experiments, correlations between trial number and accuracy were normally distributed with M=-.01, SD=.12. Consistent with our instructions that trials were unrelated, participants' responses on each trial were independent of previous responses. Lag-1 autocorrelations for the right and left cues were normally distributed with M=-.01, SD=.14.
Our key results are displayed in Table 1 ('yes' rates) and Table 2 (SDT parameters). Both tables report descriptive statistics for the filtered data.
By common standards, causal discounting occurred. Participants thought the causal target was causal more often in WA than in SA, t(76) =3.8, d=.87 . Interestingly, this is also true of participants' inferences about the non-causal target: They said 'yes' more in WA than in SA, t(76)=2.9, d=.65.
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There was no effect on sensitivity, call the alternative causal when the target was not causal. While SDT analyses cannot be applied here, if these within-subjects differences in the perceived causal strength of the alternative also reflect a shift in the participants' decision criterion (as was the case for the between-subjects analysis of responding to the target), these results suggest that participants are shifting their criterion on every trial, judging each cue relative to the other.
We also ran quasi-SDT analyses using all participants. The mean difference between h and fa (i.e., how much more often they said 'yes' to the causal than non-causal target) did not differ Again, there was no effect on sensitivity, t(149)=. 4, p=0.69, d=.06 . Conversely, the data on bias in Experiment 2 are clear. As seen in Table 2 , participants in SA were hesitant to conclude the target was causal. Interestingly, WA was also biased, albeit less, and in the other direction:
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Discussion
We demonstrated discounting in two experiments using Allan et al.'s (2008) streamed trial procedure: participants were less likely to say the target was causal when it was learned in the presence of a more contingent alternative. Critically, we also demonstrated that discounting is not due to impaired ability to detect covariation, but rather to changes in participants' response criterion. Participants' ability to discriminate between causal and non-causal trials did not vary with the strength of the alternative. However, learning about the target in the presence of the strong alternative made participants hesitant to call the target causal.
Potential Limitations
SDT requires that participants make both 'yes' and 'no' responses to the target in all trial types. Considerable effort was required to find a set of experimental parameters (contingency structures, presentation times, etc.) that yielded viable data. This led us to the paradigm we employed. Among other things, it meant that we had contingency structures with a relatively
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Causal Discounting 12 small difference between the causal and non-causal target ΔPs, which makes contingency discrimination difficult (Allan et al., 2005) . Thus, there were many non-learners. Despite these aspects of the procedure, we have reason to believe the generalizability of our results: (1) More than 80% of the participants (229 of 285 across both experiments) did discriminate between the target causal and target non-causal trials. (2) We replicated causal discounting as demonstrated with other contingency structures and methods of responding.
In addition, the contingency structures we used differed trivially in the probability of the responding after 40 events, we fit a regression model and predicted the expected increase using our contingency structures. The regression model suggests our responding should increase by .15 SDs for the causal, and .08 SDs for the non-causal, targets. Thus, although differences in P(O) could have inflated our effects slightly, they cannot account for our results. Furthermore, within each group and experiment, responding to the alternative varied significantly with the ΔP of its 'alternative' (i.e., the target), even though P(O) was the same for those contrasts.
Researchers familiar with SDT in the context of psychophysics may find a between-subjects design unusual, but between-subjects designs are commonly and successfully used when applying SDT in memory research. Although a within-subjects design might seem to increase our power, with only 72 trials, it would mean that participants would only see 18 of each trial type; thus, it would greatly increase measurement error. Moreover, our analyses of responding to the alternative replicates discounting within-subjects: Participants responded 'yes' less on trials where the target was causal than on trials in which it was non-causal.
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Finally, we acknowledge that the streamed-trial procedure is a relative newcomer in causal reasoning research. Further research exploring the relations between this task and other methods used to study causal induction would be helpful.
Theoretical Implications
Traditionally, theories of causal induction from covariation have been either associative or statistical in nature. Associative theories assume that an association is built by translating cue co-occurrences into a summary value as they are experienced (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) .
In contrast, statistical theories posit that people store memory traces of past events, and run computations that approximate statistical analyses over these observed frequencies (e.g. Schustack & Sternberg, 1981) . Current theorizing allows for multiple processes (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Perales et al., 2005; Stout & Miller, 2007) .
Research supports the hypothesis that causal inference from covariation involves processes beyond the prediction of events. For example, causal judgments might be expected to rely on frequency estimates, yet causal judgments are subject to cue interaction effects but frequency estimates are not (Price & Yates, 1995) . Causal judgments also vary with the structure of the scenario (common-cause versus common-effect), but predictions do not (Tangen & Allan, 2004) .
Thus, unique effects exist for causal judgments per se.
If sensitivity and bias are mapped onto two sets of processes, the simplest formula is sensitivity → learning, and bias → judgment. Essentially, the more you learn about something, the better you are at identifying it accurately (i.e., as contingent or not), whereas once you have the evidence for covariation, whether to say 'yes' is a judgment. From this perspective, our findings imply that discounting involves judgment rather than learning processes. The influence of judgment processes is consistent with other research. For example, participants presented
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Causal Discounting 14 with summary tables and asked if they think a cue is causal also demonstrate discounting (Goedert & Spellman, 2005) . It is difficult to attribute that discounting to an associative learning process, because the series of experiences necessary to build an association is lacking.
At first glance, our results do not appear to reinforce associationist accounts. Although numerous associative theories have been proposed, most posit differences in learning as the proximate cause of differences in behavior (Stout & Miller, 2007) . It is impossible to state
exactly how all such theories should map onto SDT's parameters, but differences in learning without a separate judgment process seems most consistent with changes in sensitivity and not bias. This is the opposite of what we found. Of associative theories, only the Comparator hypothesis (Stout & Miller, 2007) has a clearly separate judgment process which constitutes the locus of the theory's effects.
Our results do not obviously favor statistical theories either, as they typically lack a clear mechanism leading people to assess causality more tentatively. Usually, they capture causal phenomena by positing that people run computations over subsets of their experiences (Cheng & Novick, 1992) , weight various cue/outcome combinations differently, or adjust the final calculation. Of such approaches, perhaps the Power PC model (Cheng, 1997) does best. In our situation, it proposes people would divide ΔP by 1-P(O|~T,~A). This operation, in conjunction with our contingency structures, would predict lower responding to the causal target in SA than WA, but not to the non-causal target. Nevertheless, the spirit of the Power PC theory is that people accurately encode contingencies, but make adjustments when required to assess causality.
This suggests that learning is equivalent, but judgments differ, which is our interpretation.
Of course, our results do not prove conclusively that there are two sets of processes subserving causal induction. Another possibility is that people perceive covariation relatively, We tried to remain theoretically neutral here, because the full implications of these findings for causal theories require a different, and much longer, exposition. However, we suggest that our results may provide challenges for many theories.
Conclusion
We applied SDT paradigms to the phenomenon of causal discounting to determine whether it is due to sensitivity or bias. Using the streamed-trial procedure, we demonstrate that discounting is due to changes in the criterion participants use. The most straightforward interpretation is that causal discounting is a judgment phenomenon. Although further research is necessary to discriminate among more nuanced interpretations of these results, these findings are a first step in localizing this effect. 
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